There is a bridge in the city of Istanbul that, like most bridges, connects two land masses. This particular bridge however is unique; this bridge joins more than just two pieces of land, it links two continents, a sign at one end reading “Welcome to Europe” and on the opposite end another reading “Welcome to Asia.” This bridge is one of the busiest locations in Istanbul with millions of commuters crossing it everyday, driving between two separate worlds contained within one single country. For most making the journey across this bridge there is no significant difference between one side and the other, both sides being a part of the same city, the same nation, both sides having the same beautiful view of the turquoise blue Bosphorus. And yet, this bridge is momentous. This bridge embodies the very essence of the nation of Turkey. In fact, describing Turkey as a bridge is a perfect analogy. Turkey acts as a bridge for a multitude of separate entities, bridging the waters not only between the East and the West, but also between the religious and the secular, as well as the modern and the traditional. And, just like the bridge connecting the two continents, Turkey morphs depending on the direction from which it is approached, European when coming from one side, Asian when advancing from the other, religious when looking at its past, secular when anticipating its future, traditional at its core but ever branching out into the modern world. Turkey is neither one nor the other, just as the bridge itself can be claimed by neither continent. Instead, Turkey is a nation full of contradictions, contrasting components that have been brought together within one country and that can only be understood by exploring the country’s history while at the same time remaining aware of its present and future possibilities.
After arriving in Turkey and strolling through neighborhoods such as Ortakoy, Taksim, or even the tourist-packed Sultanahmet, it is impossible to deny the paradox between religion and secularism existing within the country. On the same street one can see a woman in jeans and tank tops, drinking and socializing with other women and men while a different woman passes by, her head covered with a scarf and her clothes concealed under a full length coat, even in the middle of the summer. Mosques sit adjacent to stores and bars and the call to prayer can be heard at night as young business men and women prepare to hit the clubs for a night of dancing after a long day at work. As a nation, Turkey has no official religion; according to the law, it is a completely secular state. (Kinzer 2001: 35) Nevertheless, as recently as 1999, virtually the whole of the Turkish population, 99.8 percent, claimed to be Muslim. (Brown 2000: 13) And yet, scanning the streets that number seems impossibly high. For instance, in a conversation with several Turkish students and professors at university in Istanbul, none had ever attended a Friday prayer. So from where did this contrast between the religious and the secular arise and how is it possible for these two sides to continue living together in the same country today?
Long before the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkey was a part of what was once one of the most powerful and influential empires of all time, the Ottoman Empire. Although the empire was divided into millets, various ethnic and religious groups living relatively autonomously within the empire, the empire itself, “at least in theory, was an Islamic empire, ruled on the basis of religious law” (Zurcher 2004: 10). For centuries the sultan was both the head of state as well as the head of religion, the caliph, ruling the empire under a religious thumb. (Kinzer 2001: 42) Eventually however, as the empire became more and more exposed to cultural and political ideas filtering in from the West, reforms began to be made. By the eighteenth century, Islamic law “had been confined to matters of family law and of ownership” (Zurcher 2004: 10). In the nineteenth century, these restrictions on Islam were furthered. The mid to late nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire is known as the Tanzimat. During this period, reforms, much more drastic than any previous reforms, were made, mostly due to the pressures of outside powers. Increasing secularization was one of the most noteworthy results of these reforms, enabled by the creation of “new secular laws and institutions” as well as a secular education system. (Zurcher 2004: 61-62) But it was not until the 1920s with Ataturk’s revolution and the formation of the Turkish Republic that secularization totally engulfed the country. Under Ataturk, the caliphate was abolished, along with Islamic courts, the fez and the veil were banned, and mystic and religious brotherhoods and sects were forbidden. (Kinzer 2001: 44, 62) Ataturk believed that “traditional Islam was the enemy” and through secularization he thrust religion out of the public arena. (Kinzer 2001: 62; Cagaptay 2006: 14) But even with its public explosion, Islam was not erased from the hearts and minds of its citizens and remains ever present. Throughout the twentieth century, and even today, Turkey continues to battle with consequences of the forced secularization of a historically Muslim population.
Secularization did not cause religion did not disappear for long (if it ever did at all). By the 1950s, Islam began to reappear in the public sphere, including Islamic schools, books, and periodicals and by the 1960s Islam was even back in politics. Yet, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 frightened many secularists and, fearing an Islamic regime in Turkey, they “adopted policies toward religion that in the end encouraged rather than weakened fundamentalism.” (Kinzer 2001: 62-65) And so, the dichotomy between the avid secularists and the religious fundamentalists was formed, and remains, and now whenever “parties resort to introduce Islam into the political sphere, they encounter resistance from Turkish secularism” (Cagaptay 2006: 162). The devout continue think that the state desires to crush their beliefs, while the state considers the religious and their calls for religious freedom a threat to secularism. (Kinzer 2001: 60, 12) On the other hand however, there are countless Turkish citizens who lie in the middle of this debate. While they regard themselves Muslims, they also wish to preserve the established secularism of Turkey. Ideally for these citizens, and in fact for most Turks, a compromise would be made, an agreement under which there would be religious freedom but in turn there would also be “explicit acceptance of secular rule” (Kinzer 2001: 81). Though the day that the gap between the religious and the secular is peacefully bridged may be far off, a growing number of Turks are realizing that it is a gap that must be mended in order for Turkey to continuing moving toward modernity and democracy.
Walking down Istiklal, the main drag in Istanbul, it feels as if one could be walking down a street in any Western European nation. The street is lined with stores such as Mavi and Adidas, restaurants like Starbucks and McDonalds, and is buzzing with people at all hours of the day. Sabanci University had a similar feel. No, the university does not have an Adidas and a Starbucks, but it is a thriving, modern environment. Students are educated in up-to-date and high-tech facilities by well-respected and well-known professors and academics and live in dormitories similar to (and maybe nicer than) the ones found at the University of Kansas. By visiting these two locations, as well as many others throughout the city and the country, Turkey seems like an extremely modern nation. Even so, in many other aspects, Turkey is still lagging far behind other modern countries. For instance, from one angle, Turkey can be described as “as a backward land plagued by vast social inequalities, grotesque human-rights violations and a callous, corrupt and militaristic regime” (Kinzer 2001: 8). This is in high contrast to the images and perceptions developed when considering Istitklal and Sabanci University and yet both sides are very real for the citizens of Turkey. The tug-of-war between modernity, the progression toward becoming an entirely modern nation, and tradition, the fear of change and the desperate clinging to past ways, is another defining characteristic of Turkey, and as with religion, it is also a deeply rooted one.
At one point, the Ottoman Empire was on top of the world. It had a strong military and its territory expanded vastly into the Middle East and into Europe. It was an empire full of diversity and culture, unmatched by any other in the world. Nonetheless, it was also an empire that refused to advance with the times and "from the late sixteenth century onwards, European states, especially the newly emerging nation states in Western Europe, had surpassed it economically, technologically and militarily." (Zurcher 2004: 19) The once powerful and promising empire was falling. It lost much of its land and with that much of its power, talent, and wealth. By the end of World War I and on the eve of the Turkish Republic, Turkey was in shambles. It was a poverty stricken nation of mainly illiterate, subsistence farmers who had little if any medical care and lacked any skills in trade, artisanry or engineering. (Kinzer 2001: 11) It was Ataturk, in the 1920s, who was determined to turn the nation around, to turn it toward progress and modernity, although he had to do so against the resistance of an entire nation of people not yet ready to leave their old ways. But Ataturk was unrelenting in his drive for modernization. (Kinzer 2001: 10) Ataturk “understood that Turkey can become modern only by embracing modern values,” yet it is these values that Turkey still struggles to grasp today. (Kinzer 2001: 51)
Presently, the battle between tradition and modernity lies once again between the wishes of the people and the wishes of their leaders. But this time, their roles are reversed. Previously, it was the leader, Ataturk, that forced the people to leave their past in the past and to accept modernization; today it is the people that must open the eyes of their leaders in order to direct the country forward. The citizens of Turkey are no longer poor, ignorant farmers but instead are bright, talented, experienced and highly educated. (Kinzer 2001: 19) They are people that aspire for democracy and for human rights, people that yearn to see their country gain the international respect and clout that they know it deserves. This time though their leaders are holding them back, instead of pushing them ahead. And yet the present day leaders, the military commanders, judges, prosecutors, and governors that rule the nation, would not interpret the situation in this manner. No, they believe that they are “modernity’s great and indispensable defenders,” that the population cannot be trusted, and that democracy would “unleash forces that will drag Turkey back toward ignorance and obscurantism” (Kinzer 2001: 12). And so the military and the National Security Council remain in power, instructing the elected Parliament and Prime Minister on what to do and how to act and ousting them should they misbehave, refusing to let the people voice their opinions or ignite change and once again leaving Turkey lagging behind with yet another bridge to cross. (Kinzer 2001: 13-15)
The title of this program is When East Meets West, an appropriate title for trip to a country that straddles two continents, and essentially two worlds. For hundreds of years, and not just in Turkey, the East and the West have been pitted against each other, constantly contrasted. But what is it exactly, besides the obvious factor of geographical location, which distinguishes the East from the West? And which identity should Turkey, a country that is technically situated in both the East and the West, assume? This is presently one of the foremost questions in the minds of Turks as Turkey anxiously awaits the decision regarding its pending application to the European Union, a decision that is causing tension not only in Turkey but throughout Europe as well. Should Turkey be accepted, thus officially designating it as a European nation and therefore abandoning its Asian heritage? And if it is not accepted, what will be Europe’s explanation for Turkey’s rejection?
The current situation with the European Union is not the first time that Turkey has been conflicted over whether it belongs to the East or the West. The debate can in fact be traced back once again to the Ottoman Empire. Though many consider the Ottoman Empire to be an Eastern empire, in its early years much of its expansion was actually into European territory, so much so that “the great question hanging over Europe was… whether the Ottomans would sweep into Paris and claim the entire continent” (Kinzer 2001: 5). Although the empire eventually lost most of its European land, it never was void of European influence. During the Tanzimat reforms, under the rule of Sultan Selim III, lines of communication between the Ottoman Empire and the West dramatically increased as Selim readily accepted European ways and advice in accordance with his “genuine belief that the only way to save the empire was to introduce European-style reforms.” (Zurcher 2004: 22, 56) Even the revolutionary Young Turks looked toward Europe as a shining example, Britain being their model nation (Zurcher 2004: 103). It was Ataturk however, that once again took the reforms, this time for Westernization, to the extremes. Ataturk made the adoption of Western dress mandatory, the Turkish language was translated from Arabic to Latin letters, the Muslim calendar was supplanted by the European calendar, and every Turkish citizen had to take on a last name (Kinzer 2001: 44-47). It seems as if Ataturk made every effort to transform Turkey into a Western nation, so why is it not unanimously considered, even by its own citizens, a Western country today?
Before one can assign the labels East or West, it must be known what is meant by those labels. Nowadays, many people define the East and the West in terms of religion, the Christian West and the non-Christian East. Actually, a number of people may even go as far as to say that the East is not simply non-Christian but is in fact Muslim. Whereas this is true in Turkey, the vast majority of the population identifying themselves as Muslims, the Middle East itself contains only a minority of the Muslims found around the world (Brown 2000: 12). Nevertheless, “the fact that Turkey is an Islamic country makes it fundamentally non-European in the eyes of many people” (Zurcher 2004: 336). The disapproval of Islam by Western European nations, many of which have deciding votes in determining Turkey’s acceptance into the European Union, is not just that Islam is simply different than Christianity but a naïve belief that Islam is intrinsically incompatible with another essential characteristic of European countries, democracy. Yet in fact, “Islam is no more, nor any less democratic than Christianity or Judaism,” and it may even be stated that Islam is fundamentally more compatible with the aspects of modernity and secularism that usually accompany democracy due to its tendency, in principle, to “favor individual freedoms and the capacity for religious choice.” (Filali-Ansary 2003: 196-197) Still, Turkey continues to struggle to prove that Islam can coexist with democracy. Although with its hopes set upon joining the European Union numerous changes have been made, including the further “liberalization of the political climate and of the legislation,” these alterations have not been enough. ((Zurcher 2004: 335) In order for Turkey to be accepted by the European Union it must wholeheartedly accept democracy. Only when Turkey agrees to live up to Europe’s expectations by abandoning its militaristic regime and embodying the democratic principles on which the European Union rests will Turkey be able to once more "stand like a colossus at the point where two continents come together, drawing riches from both and offering itself as a meeting point for civilizations that might otherwise drift toward calamitous confrontation." (Kinzer 2001: 25) Turkey has the great and unique potential to literally be the bridge that unites the East and the West, Asia and Europe. With an acceptance into the European Union Turkey could complete Ataturk’s dream of being a truly Western nation, while bringing with it its truly Eastern history and heritage.
Turkey is incomparable to any other country that I have ever visited. Its cultural landscape is just as diverse and colorful as the view from the top of one of the many hills of Istanbul. When taking in the panorama of the city from one of these hills, it is impossible to ignore one specific site, a landmark that expands across the Bosphorus, the bridge that connects Asia and Europe. This bridge symbolizes the countless contradictions laden within this magnificent country. And, just like this bridge, Turkey does not have to choose between either side, between being religious or secular, modern or traditional, European or Asian; from one direction it may be or the other, it is neither or it is both, but more than anything Turkey is the bridge that brings all of these characteristics together.
After arriving in Turkey and strolling through neighborhoods such as Ortakoy, Taksim, or even the tourist-packed Sultanahmet, it is impossible to deny the paradox between religion and secularism existing within the country. On the same street one can see a woman in jeans and tank tops, drinking and socializing with other women and men while a different woman passes by, her head covered with a scarf and her clothes concealed under a full length coat, even in the middle of the summer. Mosques sit adjacent to stores and bars and the call to prayer can be heard at night as young business men and women prepare to hit the clubs for a night of dancing after a long day at work. As a nation, Turkey has no official religion; according to the law, it is a completely secular state. (Kinzer 2001: 35) Nevertheless, as recently as 1999, virtually the whole of the Turkish population, 99.8 percent, claimed to be Muslim. (Brown 2000: 13) And yet, scanning the streets that number seems impossibly high. For instance, in a conversation with several Turkish students and professors at university in Istanbul, none had ever attended a Friday prayer. So from where did this contrast between the religious and the secular arise and how is it possible for these two sides to continue living together in the same country today?
Long before the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkey was a part of what was once one of the most powerful and influential empires of all time, the Ottoman Empire. Although the empire was divided into millets, various ethnic and religious groups living relatively autonomously within the empire, the empire itself, “at least in theory, was an Islamic empire, ruled on the basis of religious law” (Zurcher 2004: 10). For centuries the sultan was both the head of state as well as the head of religion, the caliph, ruling the empire under a religious thumb. (Kinzer 2001: 42) Eventually however, as the empire became more and more exposed to cultural and political ideas filtering in from the West, reforms began to be made. By the eighteenth century, Islamic law “had been confined to matters of family law and of ownership” (Zurcher 2004: 10). In the nineteenth century, these restrictions on Islam were furthered. The mid to late nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire is known as the Tanzimat. During this period, reforms, much more drastic than any previous reforms, were made, mostly due to the pressures of outside powers. Increasing secularization was one of the most noteworthy results of these reforms, enabled by the creation of “new secular laws and institutions” as well as a secular education system. (Zurcher 2004: 61-62) But it was not until the 1920s with Ataturk’s revolution and the formation of the Turkish Republic that secularization totally engulfed the country. Under Ataturk, the caliphate was abolished, along with Islamic courts, the fez and the veil were banned, and mystic and religious brotherhoods and sects were forbidden. (Kinzer 2001: 44, 62) Ataturk believed that “traditional Islam was the enemy” and through secularization he thrust religion out of the public arena. (Kinzer 2001: 62; Cagaptay 2006: 14) But even with its public explosion, Islam was not erased from the hearts and minds of its citizens and remains ever present. Throughout the twentieth century, and even today, Turkey continues to battle with consequences of the forced secularization of a historically Muslim population.
Secularization did not cause religion did not disappear for long (if it ever did at all). By the 1950s, Islam began to reappear in the public sphere, including Islamic schools, books, and periodicals and by the 1960s Islam was even back in politics. Yet, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 frightened many secularists and, fearing an Islamic regime in Turkey, they “adopted policies toward religion that in the end encouraged rather than weakened fundamentalism.” (Kinzer 2001: 62-65) And so, the dichotomy between the avid secularists and the religious fundamentalists was formed, and remains, and now whenever “parties resort to introduce Islam into the political sphere, they encounter resistance from Turkish secularism” (Cagaptay 2006: 162). The devout continue think that the state desires to crush their beliefs, while the state considers the religious and their calls for religious freedom a threat to secularism. (Kinzer 2001: 60, 12) On the other hand however, there are countless Turkish citizens who lie in the middle of this debate. While they regard themselves Muslims, they also wish to preserve the established secularism of Turkey. Ideally for these citizens, and in fact for most Turks, a compromise would be made, an agreement under which there would be religious freedom but in turn there would also be “explicit acceptance of secular rule” (Kinzer 2001: 81). Though the day that the gap between the religious and the secular is peacefully bridged may be far off, a growing number of Turks are realizing that it is a gap that must be mended in order for Turkey to continuing moving toward modernity and democracy.
Walking down Istiklal, the main drag in Istanbul, it feels as if one could be walking down a street in any Western European nation. The street is lined with stores such as Mavi and Adidas, restaurants like Starbucks and McDonalds, and is buzzing with people at all hours of the day. Sabanci University had a similar feel. No, the university does not have an Adidas and a Starbucks, but it is a thriving, modern environment. Students are educated in up-to-date and high-tech facilities by well-respected and well-known professors and academics and live in dormitories similar to (and maybe nicer than) the ones found at the University of Kansas. By visiting these two locations, as well as many others throughout the city and the country, Turkey seems like an extremely modern nation. Even so, in many other aspects, Turkey is still lagging far behind other modern countries. For instance, from one angle, Turkey can be described as “as a backward land plagued by vast social inequalities, grotesque human-rights violations and a callous, corrupt and militaristic regime” (Kinzer 2001: 8). This is in high contrast to the images and perceptions developed when considering Istitklal and Sabanci University and yet both sides are very real for the citizens of Turkey. The tug-of-war between modernity, the progression toward becoming an entirely modern nation, and tradition, the fear of change and the desperate clinging to past ways, is another defining characteristic of Turkey, and as with religion, it is also a deeply rooted one.
At one point, the Ottoman Empire was on top of the world. It had a strong military and its territory expanded vastly into the Middle East and into Europe. It was an empire full of diversity and culture, unmatched by any other in the world. Nonetheless, it was also an empire that refused to advance with the times and "from the late sixteenth century onwards, European states, especially the newly emerging nation states in Western Europe, had surpassed it economically, technologically and militarily." (Zurcher 2004: 19) The once powerful and promising empire was falling. It lost much of its land and with that much of its power, talent, and wealth. By the end of World War I and on the eve of the Turkish Republic, Turkey was in shambles. It was a poverty stricken nation of mainly illiterate, subsistence farmers who had little if any medical care and lacked any skills in trade, artisanry or engineering. (Kinzer 2001: 11) It was Ataturk, in the 1920s, who was determined to turn the nation around, to turn it toward progress and modernity, although he had to do so against the resistance of an entire nation of people not yet ready to leave their old ways. But Ataturk was unrelenting in his drive for modernization. (Kinzer 2001: 10) Ataturk “understood that Turkey can become modern only by embracing modern values,” yet it is these values that Turkey still struggles to grasp today. (Kinzer 2001: 51)
Presently, the battle between tradition and modernity lies once again between the wishes of the people and the wishes of their leaders. But this time, their roles are reversed. Previously, it was the leader, Ataturk, that forced the people to leave their past in the past and to accept modernization; today it is the people that must open the eyes of their leaders in order to direct the country forward. The citizens of Turkey are no longer poor, ignorant farmers but instead are bright, talented, experienced and highly educated. (Kinzer 2001: 19) They are people that aspire for democracy and for human rights, people that yearn to see their country gain the international respect and clout that they know it deserves. This time though their leaders are holding them back, instead of pushing them ahead. And yet the present day leaders, the military commanders, judges, prosecutors, and governors that rule the nation, would not interpret the situation in this manner. No, they believe that they are “modernity’s great and indispensable defenders,” that the population cannot be trusted, and that democracy would “unleash forces that will drag Turkey back toward ignorance and obscurantism” (Kinzer 2001: 12). And so the military and the National Security Council remain in power, instructing the elected Parliament and Prime Minister on what to do and how to act and ousting them should they misbehave, refusing to let the people voice their opinions or ignite change and once again leaving Turkey lagging behind with yet another bridge to cross. (Kinzer 2001: 13-15)
The title of this program is When East Meets West, an appropriate title for trip to a country that straddles two continents, and essentially two worlds. For hundreds of years, and not just in Turkey, the East and the West have been pitted against each other, constantly contrasted. But what is it exactly, besides the obvious factor of geographical location, which distinguishes the East from the West? And which identity should Turkey, a country that is technically situated in both the East and the West, assume? This is presently one of the foremost questions in the minds of Turks as Turkey anxiously awaits the decision regarding its pending application to the European Union, a decision that is causing tension not only in Turkey but throughout Europe as well. Should Turkey be accepted, thus officially designating it as a European nation and therefore abandoning its Asian heritage? And if it is not accepted, what will be Europe’s explanation for Turkey’s rejection?
The current situation with the European Union is not the first time that Turkey has been conflicted over whether it belongs to the East or the West. The debate can in fact be traced back once again to the Ottoman Empire. Though many consider the Ottoman Empire to be an Eastern empire, in its early years much of its expansion was actually into European territory, so much so that “the great question hanging over Europe was… whether the Ottomans would sweep into Paris and claim the entire continent” (Kinzer 2001: 5). Although the empire eventually lost most of its European land, it never was void of European influence. During the Tanzimat reforms, under the rule of Sultan Selim III, lines of communication between the Ottoman Empire and the West dramatically increased as Selim readily accepted European ways and advice in accordance with his “genuine belief that the only way to save the empire was to introduce European-style reforms.” (Zurcher 2004: 22, 56) Even the revolutionary Young Turks looked toward Europe as a shining example, Britain being their model nation (Zurcher 2004: 103). It was Ataturk however, that once again took the reforms, this time for Westernization, to the extremes. Ataturk made the adoption of Western dress mandatory, the Turkish language was translated from Arabic to Latin letters, the Muslim calendar was supplanted by the European calendar, and every Turkish citizen had to take on a last name (Kinzer 2001: 44-47). It seems as if Ataturk made every effort to transform Turkey into a Western nation, so why is it not unanimously considered, even by its own citizens, a Western country today?
Before one can assign the labels East or West, it must be known what is meant by those labels. Nowadays, many people define the East and the West in terms of religion, the Christian West and the non-Christian East. Actually, a number of people may even go as far as to say that the East is not simply non-Christian but is in fact Muslim. Whereas this is true in Turkey, the vast majority of the population identifying themselves as Muslims, the Middle East itself contains only a minority of the Muslims found around the world (Brown 2000: 12). Nevertheless, “the fact that Turkey is an Islamic country makes it fundamentally non-European in the eyes of many people” (Zurcher 2004: 336). The disapproval of Islam by Western European nations, many of which have deciding votes in determining Turkey’s acceptance into the European Union, is not just that Islam is simply different than Christianity but a naïve belief that Islam is intrinsically incompatible with another essential characteristic of European countries, democracy. Yet in fact, “Islam is no more, nor any less democratic than Christianity or Judaism,” and it may even be stated that Islam is fundamentally more compatible with the aspects of modernity and secularism that usually accompany democracy due to its tendency, in principle, to “favor individual freedoms and the capacity for religious choice.” (Filali-Ansary 2003: 196-197) Still, Turkey continues to struggle to prove that Islam can coexist with democracy. Although with its hopes set upon joining the European Union numerous changes have been made, including the further “liberalization of the political climate and of the legislation,” these alterations have not been enough. ((Zurcher 2004: 335) In order for Turkey to be accepted by the European Union it must wholeheartedly accept democracy. Only when Turkey agrees to live up to Europe’s expectations by abandoning its militaristic regime and embodying the democratic principles on which the European Union rests will Turkey be able to once more "stand like a colossus at the point where two continents come together, drawing riches from both and offering itself as a meeting point for civilizations that might otherwise drift toward calamitous confrontation." (Kinzer 2001: 25) Turkey has the great and unique potential to literally be the bridge that unites the East and the West, Asia and Europe. With an acceptance into the European Union Turkey could complete Ataturk’s dream of being a truly Western nation, while bringing with it its truly Eastern history and heritage.
Turkey is incomparable to any other country that I have ever visited. Its cultural landscape is just as diverse and colorful as the view from the top of one of the many hills of Istanbul. When taking in the panorama of the city from one of these hills, it is impossible to ignore one specific site, a landmark that expands across the Bosphorus, the bridge that connects Asia and Europe. This bridge symbolizes the countless contradictions laden within this magnificent country. And, just like this bridge, Turkey does not have to choose between either side, between being religious or secular, modern or traditional, European or Asian; from one direction it may be or the other, it is neither or it is both, but more than anything Turkey is the bridge that brings all of these characteristics together.
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